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CARA Threshold Types
• Warning / remediation threshold (“Red” threshold)
– Pc level at which warnings are issued, and active remediation considered and 
usually executed
• Analysis threshold (“Green to Yellow” threshold)
– Pc level at which analysis of event is indicated, including seeking additional 
information if warranted
• Post-remediation threshold
– Pc level to which remediation maneuvers are sized in order to achieve event 
remediation and obviate any need for immediate follow-up maneuvers
• Maneuver screening threshold
– Pc compliance level for routine maneuver screenings (more demanding than 
regular Red threshold due to additional maneuver uncertainty)
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CARA Thresholds Development Status
• Red and Green-to-Yellow thresholds established
– Type 1 and Type 2 error analysis
– Imputed workload analysis
• Post-remediation threshold methodology in work
– Rule-of-thumb in place presently
– Analysis avenues for more robust approach
• Approach envisioned for post-remediation threshold can also be 
applied to maneuver screening threshold
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RED AND YELLOW-GREEN 
THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
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The CARA “Worktier” System Defined
• System for determining how much induced work a given event 
commanded
– Worktier 1:  e-mail contact and follow-up with O/O
– Worktier 2:  HIE package produced and briefing delivered
– Worktier 3:  RMM planning conducted
– Worktier 4:  RMM executed
• Worktier level a good proxy for seriousness of event
• Worktier level thus used as “truth” criterion to choose red and 
green Pc thresholds
– Worktier 2+ recommended as particular level to use, meaning high-risk event 
set defined as those with a worktier level of 2 or higher
– Plots will, however, show performance at all four worktier levels (1+, 2+, 3+, 
and 4)
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Worktiers and Pc Threshold Circularity
• Worktiers reasonable proxy for seriousness of event
• However, Pc levels presently used to establish seriousness
– Thus, must be careful in using historical worktier data to set Pc levels—easy to 
devolve into circular argumentation
• Original examination used dataset from period before Pc thresholds 
established and in place
– Thus legitimate dataset from which to establish threshold set
• For this reason, updates to original values no longer easily 
achievable through data mining
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Exploratory Analysis:
Event Maximum Pc as Predictor of Worktier
• How good a predictor of the eventual work tier assignment is the 
maximum Pc during the event?
• Examined all events in 2011-2013 
• One graph for each work tier
– Quad-chart format shows results for each cumulative worktier level
• False alarm rate (blue line):  % of cases in which the Pc indicated a 
serious event but the event was actually not high-risk
– Also called a “type 1” error, and is a nuisance factor
• Missed detection rate (green line):  % of cases in which the Pc 
indicated a non-high-risk situation but the event actually was high 
risk
– Also called a “type 2” error, and is the more serious error type
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Event Maximum Pc as Predictor of Worktier:
Results
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Type 1 and 2 Errors for Predicting Worktier 1+ Events
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Event Maximum Pc as Predictor of Worktier:
Interpretation of Results
• Interpretive questions center on tolerable levels for the type 1 and 
type 2 errors
• Type 2 error rates
– 0.01% to 0.1% for a 1E-05 to 1E-03 Pc threshold range—quite small
– Events that are just below the red threshold can be promoted manually red 
and thus be processed as HIEs
• Type 1 error rates
– Range from 10% to 0.5%--again, not very large and seemingly tolerable
• Overall construct thus looks promising
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Individual Event CDMs as Predictor of Worktier
• A typical event consists of a chain of CDMs from 7 days to 1-2 days 
from TCA
• These usually begin with a smallish Pc value and increase to a 
maximum, then decrease somewhat rapidly
• Question now is how well each pre-max Pc value will predict the 
eventual worktier level of the event
– This is the way CONOPS will actually operate
• Certain to perform worse than using only the max Pc value as a 
predictor
– But may still perform quite adequately for CONOPS purposes
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Individual Event OCMs as Predictor of Worktier:
Results
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Individual Event OCMs as Predictor of Worktier:
Interpretation
• As expected, performance is worse with this arrangement
• Type 2 error rates higher
– These are between 0.5% and 1% for the 1E-05 to 1E-03 range
– Not blissfully low, but not particularly surprising or disturbing given what is 
being attempted
• Initial relatively low Pc values in an event not readily predictive of event destiny
• Consequence is not a missed event, only that event will not be caught as early
– Curve relatively flat, especially below 1E-04
• Very little marginal gain from choosing a lower threshold (e.g., 1E-05)
• Type 1 error rates not very different from previous 
– Not surprising, given typically lower Pc values at the beginning of events
• Rare that early-event Pc would exceed red threshold, not be the maximum Pc, and 
then drop sufficiently quickly that event would not remain an HIE
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Green-To-Yellow Threshold
• Idea is to set a lower bound on Pc so that events with a Pc below 
this threshold will almost never become high-risk events
• Type 1 error:  Pc is above this threshold but never becomes high 
risk
– Not really a false alarm, as it is expected that the great majority of non-green 
Pc values will remain yellow and never become high risk events
– However, to maintain parallelism with construct used for setting red threshold, 
appropriate to label it a  Type 1 error
• Type 2 error:  Pc is below this threshold but becomes high risk
– Even here, the problem is not particularly serious:  events are not missed but 
just have their true severity discovered somewhat later
• Investigate against all pre-max-Pc OCMs in each event
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Green Threshold Performance:
Pre-max-OCMs in each Event
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Green Threshold Performance:
Interpretation
• Type 2 error performance
– Stable at 0.015% for 1E-08 to 1E-06
– Numbers quite low
• Type 1 error performance
– Ranges from 30% to 20%
– Numbers seem high, but actually have little significance
• Essentially # of yellow events that never become red—this is expected
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Concurrent Events
• If an event’s Pc exceeds the red threshold, it becomes an HIE
– Usual dynamics is for the event to remain at this level until TCA
• Can thus determine the number of concurrent HIEs implied by a 
particular red threshold
– # of concurrent HIEs per day over the 2011-2013 period
– Summarized by 50th, 68th, and 95th percentiles
– Separate lines for all satellites and maneuvrable satellites only
• Graph on next slide
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Concurrent Events Plot
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Concurrent Events:
Interpretation
• Workload becomes problematic around 5E-04 with current staffing
• Must also consider imputed workload on missions with more 
frequent HIEs
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Satellite Lifetime Conjunction Risk
• Aerospace study developed factor for satellite lifetime conjunction 
risk calculation
– 1E-08 per 10 m2 of spacecraft projected area per day
– Based on older version of ORDEM and not orbit regime dependent, so a 
durable result would require re-execution of the study
– However, factor can be used to produce results to provide orientation
• Contour plot gives composite satellite conjunction risk as a function 
of spacecraft size and years on orbit
– Colors represent log10(Pc)
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Lifetime Conjunction Risk Contour Plot
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Satellite Lifetime Conjunction Risk:
Interpretation
• Satellites with a reasonable lifetime on orbit (~10 years)  and a non-
trivial size (~4m2) have a lifetime conjunction risk of ~3E-04
• Does not make sense to remediate conjunctions with a risk much 
smaller than this
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Overall Summary
• Analysis does not point to single value for red or green threshold
• However
– Region between 1E-04 and 5E-04 seems to be a reasonable choice for red 
threshold
• Type 2 error rates OK (0.05% or so)
• Type 1 error rates OK also (~5%)
– Not much improvement in situation in choosing a smaller threshold
• Type 2 error curves relatively flat
– Workload, however, does increase substantially when smaller threshold 
chosen
– Smaller thresholds begin to approach lifetime conjunction risk values, most of 
which is due to untrackable small debris
• CARA ~4E-04 choice, while not made inevitable by this analysis, is 
reasonably supported by it
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POST-MANEUVER THRESHOLD 
DETERMINATIONS
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CARA Post-Remediation Threshold
• Current recommendation is to choose maneuver to reduce 
cumulative Pc to 1E-10
– Rule of thumb that has arisen over the years
– Intent is essentially to eliminate need for follow-up maneuver because original 
maneuver inadequately sized
• Many missions now push back against this conservative value
– Can put missions outside of control box
– Even if executable, can consume large amount of fuel
– No rigorous justification at present for value
• Sketch of expected approach to resolution to follow
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Pc Uncertainty and Post-Maneuver Remediation
• Pc Uncertainty construct pursued by CARA for years; briefed 
recently at AAS (paper 16-241)
• Considers all of the uncertainties in the input parameters to 
generate a PDF of Pc values, rather than a single value
• Can use to determine likelihood of obtaining a Pc of a certain value 
or higher at a given percentile point
– E.g., 5% or lower chance that the Pc will exceed 1E-04
• Can incorporate into Maneuver Trade-Space functionality
– Function presently produces contour plot of Pc as a function of maneuver size 
and maneuver execution time (phasing)
– Pc uncertainty can be used instead to give the likelihood of the post-maneuver 
Pc exceeding a specified threshold
• Perhaps 4.4E-04 or 1E-05 (red and maneuver planning thresholds)
• Graph could show likelihood of Pc exceeding 1E-05; perhaps choose 2% or less
– Frames output in terms of likelihood of post-maneuver high risk
– Works best if maneuver execution error incorporated into construct
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CARA Maneuver Screening Threshold
• Same approach as for RMM sizing can be used
• Both canonical threshold and percentile point could be different
• Setting of percentile points can be informed by regular operational 
practice
– i.e., percentile point to be used when evaluating red threshold under regular 
conditions
